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HEALTH FINANCING AND FAMILY PLANNING IN 
THE CONTEXT OF UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE: 
CONNECTING THE DISCOURSE IN KENYA 
INTRODUCTION
Financing is a major challenge and concern for the future of family planning (FP) pro-
grams. As countries commit to increasing access to and quality of FP services and to 
universal health coverage (UHC), it is crucial that UHC schemes include FP and other 
reproductive health (RH) services. Strategic purchasing of FP quality services from 
public and private - including for profit and not-for-profit - healthcare providers could 
accelerate progress toward UHC.
It is increasingly recognized that the FP2020 goals will not be met without adequate 
attention to quality; and that a sustained focus on quality of care requires financing 
at the policy and program levels.  While the importance of financing is recognized 
in relation to quality, the ‘how’ of financing FP within the context of UHC is not well 
understood.
This brief targets the ‘bridge’ constituency that is coalescing between the health 
financing and FP communities of practice around a shared interest in making ac-
cess to health services universal.   With this brief, we aim to highlight experiences in 
Kenya, given that there is a body of experience with health financing reforms and UHC 
schemes and a relatively strong national FP program. The Kenya case study is instruc-
tive for other countries with decentralized and mixed health systems as they seek to 
integrate FP within their own UHC initiatives and health financing reforms.
METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE
The Kenya brief is the companion to the technical brief entitled ‘Health financing and 
family planning in the context of Universal Health Care: connecting the discourse.’  It 
has drawn upon on selected published and grey literature on health financing, FP and 
UHC within in the Kenya context. The Kenya brief is presented using the 5P ‘organizing 
framework’ in (Table 1) overleaf.
POLITIES - WHY TO PURCHASE
The Government of Kenya (GoK) has expressed its political commitment to UHC and the 
provision of quality health care for all. This is articulated in the Constitution of Kenya 
(2010) and Kenya Vision 2030 long-term development goals. To enable Kenyans to 
realize their constitutional right to health, the GoK has prioritized universal access to 
primary health care (PHC) with attention to maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH) 
services. An MNCH focus does not make explicit the societal and economic benefits of 
FP nor is this politically championed. MNCH also competes with other priority inter-
ventions, such as non-communicable diseases (NCDs). PHC services, MNCH and FP 
inclusive, are challenged by gaps in coverage of essential health services and quality 
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FIGURE 1. Health facility in Bungoma 
County, Kenya
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of care, with high provider absence from health facilities, low 
adherence to clinical guidelines, and deficits in commodities 
and infrastructure (World Bank, 2013). 
Political commitment has not translated into adequate 
domestic financing and is one reason for observed health 
system impediments. The GoK spends about US$ 2.7 billion 
on health care annually, or approximately $55 per capita, al-
locating about a third of the amount committed to under the 
Abuja Declaration; this proportion has been decreasing over 
time (GoK/MoH, 2016). About 63.3% of total health expen-
diture (THE) is funded publicly, including donor support and 
health insurance (11% THE) while a further 36.7% is funded 
privately, predominately through out-of-pocket (OOP) expendi-
ture at the point of service (GoK/MoH, 2012). Donor and pri-
vate sector contributions have declined over time and remain 
largely off-budget and issue-specific (GoK/MoH, 2012). 
While the GoK is increasingly using the language of UHC, 
there is a lack of alignment of health financing mecha-
nisms. A health financing strategy has been drafted but has 
yet to be endorsed (GoK/MoH, 2012). Financing is further 
complicated by devolution, through which the 47 county gov-
ernments control more than two thirds of health expenditure 
(GoK/MoH, 2015). The National Hospital Insurance Fund 
(NHIF), considered the main vehicle for UHC, covers about 
20% of the population, mostly through mandatory enrollment 
of the formal sector. Efforts are in place to expand coverage, 
including the informal sector and indigent populations which 
should see this proportion increase. The more recent UHC 
pilot in four counties, which was intended to operate through 
the NHIF, has by-passed this scheme, and will see user fees 
removed writ large in the public sector. It is unclear what the 
implications of this move mean to the NHIF or UHC plans 
more broadly.    
Health care purchasing arrangements are largely pas-
sive and not performance-based. At present, the GoK has 
focused on input-based financing through pre-determined 
annual budgets allocated through the Ministry of Finance. 
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Purchasing domains Purchasing elements FP considerations 
Polities: Why to purchase (rationale 
and institutional arrangements)
• Political commitment
• Institutional arrangements
• Purchaser alignment (across 
mechanisms)
• Monitoring and accountability
• Performance management
• Societal benefits (FP rights, 
gender equality)
• Economic benefits 
(demographic dividend) 
• Normative environment and 
ability to realise rights for FP 
• Stewardship and ownership (e.g. 
government and donors, central 
and decentralized)
• Fragmentation and adequacy of 
financing (horizontal and 
vertical coherence)
People: For whom to purchase • Defined target clientele
• Clientele awareness
• Community and society 
engagement
• Unmet need 
• Equity (e.g. poor women and 
men, adolescents)
• Client continued use (through 
method choice)
• Financial barriers/out-of-pocket 
expenditure
Package: What to purchase • Defined benefit objectives 
• Defined benefit package
• Broad method mix to improve 
choice, enable switching, and 
reduce discontinuation
• FP integration into RMNCAH 
continuum/packages
Provider: From whom to purchase • Contracting
• Accreditation
• Integration (of public and 
private providers)
• Physical access/choice of outlet
• Minimum quality standards
• Integration of the private sector 
• Client realization of FP rights
Payment: How to purchase • Payment rates
• Payment methods
• Provider autonomy 
• Claims processing
• Quality assurance (data and 
clinical)
• Likelihood of being offered 
choice of FP method (e.g. pro-
vider behaviour)
• Efficiency and quality
• Regulatory and public financial 
management 
TABLE 1. Strategic purchasing and FP
3Output-based financing is also done, mainly through the 
NHIF. There is no definition of strategic purchasing provided 
for within MoH policy documents, however the NHIF refers to 
this as the ‘continuous search for the best ways to maximise 
health system performance by deciding which interventions 
should be purchased, how, and from whom’ based on the 
Resilient and Responsive Health Systems (RESYST) definition 
(RESYST, 2014).
PEOPLE: FOR WHOM TO PURCHASE
There has been uneven progress in reaching women with 
FP services. While recent data indicate that Kenya has 
achieved its FP2020 goal of 58% modern contraceptive 
use by married women, progress has been starkly uneven 
across the country: the modern contraceptive prevalence 
rate (mCPR) remains as low as 2% among married women 
in northeastern counties, compared to 76% in central coun-
ties — and the rate of contraceptive use among the poorest 
is half that of the rest of the population (GoK/KNBS, 2014). 
There is also very high unmet need within the 15-24-year-
old cohort (48%) and in rural areas where women tend to 
have sex earlier and use contraception later (IQVIA, 2018). 
This suggests that both supply- and demand-side barriers 
continue to limit access to FP, particularly for poor women, 
men, and adolescents. 
It is unclear the contribution of financial barriers to access 
and equity constraints for the poor and other marginalised 
populations. There is a lack of comprehensive data to 
estimate OOP expenditure on RH, including FP (Sidze et al, 
2013). While FP services are intended to be free within the 
public health system, a study by Radovich et al (2017) indi-
cated that only one-half of modern method users reported 
obtaining their method at no cost. Monitoring by PMA2020 
also estimated that 73.5% of women paid for FP services, 
despite 60% of women receiving their service from a public 
service delivery point, where FP is supposed to be free 
at point of use. This suggests that FP OOP expenditure is 
ubiquitous in Kenya.     
There is increasing emphasis on differentiating population 
segments so that FP subsidies can be targeted towards 
those who need it. This is in recognition of limitations with 
government domestic financing and over reliance on donor 
financing (FP2020 Kenya, 2018). Donor and government 
financing have largely focused on commodities, given 
predicted financing gaps in the commodity pipeline, which 
have been further complicated by devolution. In response, 
a total market approach (TMA) has been proposed in order 
to ‘differentiate population segments according to ability 
to pay and identify which market players are best placed to 
reach each segment’ (FP2020 Kenya).
This approach assumes an ability to segment the market 
based on willingness to pay and may not consider the 
intersectionality of gender with other social stratifiers. For 
example, women already incur more OOP costs for health 
than men and OOP expenditure may prevent more women 
than men from utilizing essential services (Witter et al, 
2017). While the global evidence on user fees as a barrier 
to FP is inconclusive, poorer and/or younger populations 
appear more price sensitive than the average population 
(Korachais et al, 2016).  In the Kenya context, given high 
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FIGURE 2: Kenya’s FP s-curve
Source: Avenir Health/Track20
levels of unmet need for FP and its co-location with more 
marginalised and poorer populations, focusing on making 
markets work for these segments is suggested. Figure 2 
exemplifies this as counties with lower mCPR (those at the 
bottom of the S-curve) are those with higher poverty rates, 
lower literacy and economic empowerment and tend to be 
concentrated at the ‘outer edges’ of the country, in the arid 
and semi-arid lands of Kenya.
PACKAGE: WHAT TO PURCHASE
In the absence of a health financing strategy, benefit objec-
tives and priority setting have not always been explicit or 
transparent. The MoH defined benefit package of services, 
the Kenya Essential Package of Health (KEPH), considered 
more oriented to the public sector, has not guided the 
development of NHIF packages (Tama et al, 2017). In lieu 
of this, successive NHIF packages have been added (Figure 
3), without broad consultation or consideration of equity 
(Munge et al, 2017). These have increasingly catered to 
NCDs given the burden of lifestyle diseases among higher 
socio-economic groups, including those in formal employ-
ment, the primary members of the NHIF.
More recently (2018), a health benefits advisory panel was 
established to define a UHC benefits package. It is unclear 
what guiding principles were used by the panel, the majority 
of whom were male and medical. Arrangements such as 
these do not suggest explicit protection and careful linking 
of benefits to needs of target populations, such as poor 
women and adolescent girls. This may be due to the MoH’s 
explicit attention to women in relation to their reproductive 
roles, as mothers, through the provision of a free maternity 
scheme, entitled Linda Mama. A secondary school student 
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package has also recently been introduced. This does not 
include contraception but does allow students to be linked 
to Linda Mama for free maternity care. Neither of these 
schemes adequately address FP services and prevention of 
pregnancy. 
FP is included in the NHIF national scheme and Linda 
Mama; however, this is not well understood by providers 
or insurance members (or even by NHIF staff). Permanent 
methods, tubal ligation and vasectomy, are included as 
in-patient services paid on a fixed fee-for-service basis. 
All other methods, including long-acting reversible contra-
ception (LARC), are included in the out-patient scheme, 
paid through capitation. Within the Linda Mama scheme, 
post-partum FP is included as part of post-natal care (PNC) 
but the reimbursement rate for each PNC visit is flat and 
does not reflect the cost of offering this service. A Kenya 
case study from the Africa Health Markets for Equity (AHME) 
program noted that, in many instances, NHIF branch staff 
and accredited providers were unclear on the inclusion of 
FP, in terms of specific services and methods, as part of the 
out-patient scheme (Appleford and Owino, 2017). This is 
not without reason, as NHIF out-patient guidance is vague 
(Figure 4). Guidance indicates the provision of natural, 
hormonal, and permanent FP but does not specify which 
methods, except for IUCD. This lack of clarity has implica-
tions for adoption of specific methods, method switching 
and continuation. 
PROVIDER: FROM WHOM TO PURCHASE
Kenya has a mixed health system, comprised of public and 
private providers, that is largely pro-PHC (Figure 5). This is 
comprised of an estimated 8,400 health facilities distributed 
FIGURE 3. NHIF benefit packages (national scheme)
across the country. Forty-nine percent of health facilities 
are private, comprised of commercial for-profit providers 
(33%) and not-for-profit providers (16%) (GoK/MoH, 2014). 
The private sector provides over 40% of services, mainly 
curative, and plays a key role in extending services to hard-
to-reach areas and populations. Despite this, coverage of 
both public and private health facilities remains uneven – 
at its extremes, There is a concentration of health facilities 
in Nairobi county as it is the seat of the capital city and a 
large urban area; on the other hand, rural areas such as 
Isiolo county are underserved with fewer facilities.  Physical 
access therefore remains a challenge for many Kenyans, 
and has a bearing on rights to realise fertility intentions 
through FP.
The composition and mix of public and private providers 
allow for a range of purchasing options at national and 
county level. These arrangements include:
• The Kenya Medical Supplies Agency (KEMSA) purchas-
es contraceptive commodities, that are then ware-
housed and distributed to county stores. These are 
paid for through ear-marked sources of financing (via 
donors and the national government), given that most 
counties have not purchased FP commodities through 
their own revenue sources. Public facilities are given 
priority for commodities, however private facilities may 
also access these, when available, if they are regis-
tered with a Master Facility List number and provide 
monthly service reports using MoH registers. 
• National and county governments (47 in total) purchase 
healthcare services from public health facilities, which 
they own. This includes three tertiary care hospitals 
(national level) and primary and secondary public 
health facilities (county level). Services are paid for 
through line-item budgets, the majority of which goes 
to personal emoluments leaving little available for pro-
grams, such as RH/FP.
• The NHIF purchases services from public and private 
health facilities on behalf of registered NHIF members. 
These are defined in various service packages, ranging 
from the most basic (SupaCover) to more compre-
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FIGURE 4. FP guidance within NHIF documentation
Family planning
• Consultation with a clinician
• Health education on natural and artificial family planning 
methods
• Assessment for appropriateness of particular 
methods (Natural, Hormonal, and IUDs)
• Initiation/administration of a particular FP method
• Change of a family planning method
Radiology Services – Basic x-rays are covered under the 
general outpatient and inpatient care while MRI and CT scans 
are available in select facilities under a referral system with a 
pre-authorization from NHIF
Inpatient Services – Including accommodation/bed charges, 
nursing care, consultation, prescribed drugs/medication, 
laboratory services, surgery, physiotherapy, specialist 
consultation and treatment
Maternity Services – including prenatal care, child delivery 
- normal and caesarean section, postnatal care, Manual 
Vacuum Aspiration (MVA) and family planning services
Kidney Care package – including Renal Dialysis through  
inpatient or outpatient for a maximum of two sessions in a 
week, Kidney transplants at approved facilities
Drug and Rehabilitation services – at accredited rehabilitation 
centers at maximum of one treatment session in a year.
hensive packages (e.g. civil servants and corporate 
schemes). The in-patient package includes surgical 
FP procedures while the out-patient package includes 
long- and short-acting methods of FP. 
• The NHIF purchases services from public and private 
health facilities under Linda Mama as part of its man-
aged schemes and sponsored programs. The maternity 
service scheme was formerly managed as a fee exempt 
service package by the MoH, whereby public health 
facilities were reimbursed for foregone user fees at 
agreed reimbursement rates. The Linda Mama scheme 
has extended this to private facilities and, in theory, in-
cludes post-partum FP (counseling, commodity, service 
and any after care requirements). 
• Results-based purchasing, which entails financing 
from donors (e.g. World Bank and the Global Financing 
Facility), channeled through the Ministry of Finance to 
purchase services at county level. While purchasing 
mainly targets public providers, counties may also pur-
chase services from the private sector should they wish 
to do so. FP is one of six results-based performance 
indicators.  
• Bespoke county UHC schemes intended to purchase 
PHC services for indigent populations. Often this is in 
the form of removal of user fees at public hospitals 
(given that primary levels are, in principle, free). These 
schemes have been initiated at the request of county 
governors and are often politically motivated.
The range of purchasing points necessitate coherence be-
tween national and county level. In some instances, this is 
demonstrated; for example, results-based purchasing is ini-
tiated at national level and executed at county level and is 
coordinated through annual workplans implemented mainly 
through the public sector. In other instances, this is not 
demonstrated. For example, commodity procurement, initi-
ated and financed by counties, is used to procure commodi-
ties from KEMSA. However, counties have not prioritized - or 
resourced - FP to the level previously done by the national 
MoH before devolution. As noted, ‘the Kenya government 
provided 40% of FP commodities in 2013, dropping to 2.9% 
in 2015 due to changes related to the decentralization of 
the health budget. Based on lessons learnt, there is now 
near consensus that, procurement of FP commodities 
should not have been devolved’ (GoK/MoH, 2017).
The mix of public and private providers also necessitate an 
integrated or whole sector approach to health service  
delivery. However, county departments of health, the stew-
ards of PHC, may view the private sector more as ‘foe’ than 
‘friend’. This is reflective of an emergent political economy 
in Kenya where the private sector is being presented in 
government and the media as ‘profit driven’. This viewpoint 
appears to emanate from capture of the NHIF market by the 
private sector, when the public sector was in a particularly 
weakened state during sequential industrial action by doc-
tors and nurses in 2017. This portrayal of the private sector 
has been writ large and may extend to health facilities 
operating in Kenya’s rural counties. In these contexts, some 
private providers, particularly smaller, female run clinics 
and nursing homes, report being discriminated against by 
the NHIF, through such tactics as delayed or frustrated NHIF 
and Linda Mama accreditation and processing of reim-
bursement claims (Appleford, forthcoming). Active participa-
tion of the private sector in purchasing arrangements, such 
as the NHIF and Linda Mama, has implications for client 
choice, particularly where physical access and FP availabili-
ty and quality in the public sector may be constrained.
PAYMENT: HOW TO PURCHASE
While Kenya’s health sector has articulated long-term 
policies, these do not explicitly address how to purchase.  
Within the Kenya Health Policy (2014-2030), and a five-year 
strategic plan, the Kenya Health Sector Strategic Plan, this 
is implied more than stated, through emphasis on health 
systems efficiency and quality (Tama et al, 2017). The MoH 
defined benefit package, the Kenya Essential Package for 
Health (KEPH), is also silent on strategic purchasing. 
In practice, purchasing mechanisms (outlined under 
provider) tend to operate in isolation with implications for 
efficiency and quality. While greater decision making over 
domestic resources was intended to reap a ‘devolution 
dividend’, this has not been optimized due to weak coor-
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FIGURE 5. Health facility composition
46% public and 
private 
dispensaries
35% private 
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nursing homes
13% public 
health 
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7dination between national and county levels (GoK/MoH, 
2016). This is most clearly exemplified by the commodity 
disconnect between counties and KEMSA. Within county 
health systems, devolution has also been accompanied by 
a perceived trend toward reduced autonomy among public 
health facilities (Barasa et al, 2017). This trend, termed 
‘recentralization within decentralization’ (Barasa et al, 
2017) has in effect countered the objectives of devolution 
through, inter alia, reduced responsiveness and local 
accountability in many of Kenya’s counties. In the case of 
FP, this has created a situation of erratic FP commodity 
availability and depressed quality and choice within the 
public sector.
Choice of payment method may also depress the pro-
vision of FP under the NHIF.  Within the NHIF outpatient 
scheme, capitation was selected as the preferred means 
of provider payment ‘to induce positive incentives in the 
health delivery system’ (GoK, 2012). However, this may 
not be the case for FP. While capitation is a cost contain-
ment strategy, some FP services, such as LARC, are less 
likely to be offered by providers as there is no additional 
reimbursement for such services. Instead, capitation is 
likely to induce providers to offer cheaper, easier to ad-
minister methods, over LARC methods that require more 
time, skills and consumables. This, in effect, may reduce 
contraceptive choice and result in continued OOP expen-
diture for women covered under the NHIF.
A similar situation also exists for post-partum FP under 
the Linda Mama scheme. A case study from Bungoma 
county found that none of the providers interviewed as 
part of the study were aware that post-partum FP was in-
cluded as part of the PNC package as the reimbursement 
rate for each PNC visit is flat and low (KES 250 or US 
$2.50 per visit) and does not come with an additional re-
imbursement or guarantee of free commodities (Appleford 
and Mbuthia, 2018). The effective inclusion of modern 
post-partum FP in Linda Mama would allow Kenya a via-
ble strategy for improving its uptake, which is estimated 
at only 16% at six months, despite an estimated 64% of 
women delivering in health facilities (Avenir Health, 2017). 
This is a missed opportunity for post-partum women un-
der Linda Mama, many of whom are rural and poor.
CONCLUSION
FP uptake in Kenya has grown significantly but county 
disparities and population inequities remain. Devolution, 
while intended to address health system performance 
and accountability, has contributed to a situation of FP 
commodity insecurity, with implications for equity and 
access. While more can be done within the envelope of 
available health financing mechanisms, there is need for 
sustained and additional resources to meet current de-
mands for FP and address unmet and latent need across 
counties represented on Kenya’s S-curve. 
Transition away from donor to domestic financing is not 
clearly articulated or well stewarded within the Kenya con-
text. This is compounded by an array of sources of financing 
and purchasing points. The capacity of the national and 
county level to steward the public and private sectors and 
create the conditions for active purchasing from both is 
required. This includes autonomous decision making over 
financial resources within public health facilities as well as 
the inclusion and active participation of private providers in 
UHC schemes. Within these schemes, how FP services are 
compensated should balance incentives for efficiency with 
incentives for appropriate provision using the rights-based 
approach to user-centric care so that risks of sub-optimal 
outcomes are mitigated. The five P framework serves to 
highlight disconnects but also opportunities that could 
guide greater alignment across purchasing mechanisms. 
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